I've been reading Choosing Reality, a book on Buddhism by B. Alan Wallace. As always seems to be the case when I read up on Buddhism, I'm finding the exposition more confusing than helpful.
In his description of Buddhism's Middle Way, which he calls Buddhist centrism, Wallace tells us, "Phenomena are brought into existence through the processes of verbal and conceptual designation." (p. 122)
Now, stop and think about this. It means that everything we perceive around us is created by our own thinking - our "processes of verbal and conceptual designation," i.e., labeling and categorizing. Presumably if we could not name or categorize a tree, then trees would not exist.
But how could we name or categorize anything if it didn't already exist? Since animals don't designate and conceptualize, do trees not exist for them? Why should the ability to name something have the magic power to summon it into existence? If I can name and conceptualize a unicorn, does that mean unicorns exist?
Lest you think I exaggerate or misinterpret Wallace's position, here is another passage where he makes himself very clear. First he argues that an oxygen molecule does not "intrinsically" (i.e., essentially, ultimately, really) exist. Then he says,
Such entities are brought into existence by the process of conceptual designation: we designate certain experimental phenomena as evidence for the existence of energy, quarks, and so on; and as that convention is accepted, the designated entity exists. But had the entity never been conceived, it would not exist at all. Moreover ... the conceptual designation of an object is retroactive: for example, once electrons have been conceived, they can be said to have existed for many billions of years in the past. [pp. 124,125; emphases added]
Get that? Oxygen molecules did not exist until we could conceptualize them. But once we were able to do this, they "retroactively" existed for billions of years!
What is true at the atomic and subatomic levels is also true at the macroscopic level of daily experience. Wallace writes, "If the basic components of the physical world lack intrinsic existence independent of conceptual designation, the same must be true of the physical universe as a whole." (p. 125)
The whole physical universe, then, exists now (and retroactively) only because of our "conceptual designation."
Trying to clarify this point, which certainly requires clarification, Wallace proceeds:
The electron that is conceived by [the mind] does not exist independently of that mind, nor does that mind exist independently of the electron that it conceives. The relationship between the two is not a causal or sequential one. It is more like the relation between a husband and a wife: a man is not a husband unless he has a wife, and a woman is not a wife unless she has a husband. (p. 127)
But clearly this analogy is silly, since the husband/wife relationship is a matter of terminology, while the existence of electrons is a matter of empirical investigation. The distinction is comparable to that between an analytic and a synthetic proposition.
If everything that we believe to exist depends upon mental and verbal designation, it follows that different cultures and even different individuals may dwell in diverse conventional realities. [p. 133]
Yes, this conclusion would follow ... which means, evidently, that if my mental and verbal designations include trees, and yours do not, then I live in a world with trees and you don't. Or if I designate the world as round, and you designate it as flat, then the world is round for me and flat for you.
Then follows a very odd statement:
If a theory is based upon experience, is conceptually internally consistent, and is not refuted on empirical or rational grounds, the centrist view maintains that it may be deemed valid. In that case, what shall we do with competing, incompatible theories that equally satisfy those criteria? We may of course choose any of them as our conventionally valid theory. In so doing, that theory becomes the reality with which we shall involve ourselves. [p. 136, emphases added]
Remember, we have just learned that reality exists only in accordance with our mental framework. Yet now we are told that a theory can be "based upon experience" (the experience we manufacture via our own theorizing?), and what's more, it can be "refuted on empirical or rational grounds." Empirically refuted - when empirical facts themselves are the creation of our own thinking?
If our conceptualizing and theorizing brings about the phenomena of the physical world, as we have been informed, then how could we ever encounter any phenomena inconsistent with our concepts and theories?
None of this makes sense to me, and I'm by no means certain it is even intended to make sense. I think it is really just a series of pardoxical pronouncements, the purpose of which is to clear the mind of all preconceptions by undercutting one's certainty about everything. If this is true, then it may be a useful therapeutic technique for bringing about psychological growth and healing, even if it is of little value in resolving metaphysical problems.
Wallace himself hints that the ultimate purpose of Buddhist teaching is purely pragmatic:
The fundamental mental affliction is confusion, and this refers specifically to the tendency of reifying oneself, others, and the world at large. A confused mind conceives of people and everything else as intrinsic, absolute entities. This mental distortion lies at the root of all other mental afflictions. The individual does not exist as an isolated, independent entity, intrinsically cut off from other sentient beings and the rest of the universe. Rather, each person exists as independently related events: neither our existence nor our degree of well-being is independent from the rest of our environment. [p. 151]
By seeing the world in this nondualistic way, a person may experience relief from anxiety, anger, worry, and other aspects of "confusion." Buddhist teachings are probably very useful in this regard.
But do they shed any light on the real nature of trees or atoms or the universe? Not as far as I can see.
If there's enlightenment to be found here, I'm afraid I'm still in the dark.
I am not sure what non-duality has to do with his rather odd flavor of solipsism. He doesn't make sense to me, either.
Posted by: Matthew Cromer | September 18, 2006 at 03:13 PM